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Constitutional LaW-MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAVE FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-Cohen v. Ches-
terfield County School Board, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
411 U.S. 947 (1973).*
The fourteenth amendment' permits states to enact laws affecting some
groups or citizens differently from others unless the group or citizen classi-
fication is for reasons wholly irrelevant to the objective sought by the state
in enacting the regulation. 2 In the context of sex discrimination, the United
States Supreme Court only recently found a classification based on sex to
be in violation of the equal protection clause.3 The Court's decision repre-
sents the beginning of a judicial assault on sex discrimination, conforming
to modern social trends in this area.4 Protection of the female, the basic
idea underlying the treatment of women by Western culture,5 was often the
* Reversal on January 21, 1974. The Supreme Court found the mandatory maternity
leave's termination provision violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. 42
U.S.L.W. 4186.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802, 808-09 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).
3. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of the case see 1972 Wis. L. REv. 626.
At common law women were legal nonentities which raised some doubts as to whether the
Constitution was originally meant to include women. The only express inclusion of women
in the Constitution was in the nineteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment, and
especially the equal protection clause, at first only applied to prevent discrimination against
blacks. See Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. REV. 723
(1935).
Reed v. Reed became the springboard for Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),
which changed the Court's nineteenth century attitude toward women:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of
"romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal, but
in a cage. Id. at 684.
4. A leader in the feminist movement summarizes the modem trend. Siedenberg, The
Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL
L. REv. 262 (1970):
Recently, however, there has been an upsurge of the feminist movement, and men are
being forced to take a second look at some of the paternalistic laws they have pro-
pounded. Although challenge to the laws adversely affecting women is presently at
about the same stage that the civil rights movement occupied in the 1930's, in the last
few years there has nevertheless been a small beginning towards equal rights. Id. at
262.
5. Early Supreme Court pronouncements illustrate the protective view:
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
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rationale for upholding various statutes and regulations.6 However, a more
complex and novel issue concerning women is that of mandatory maternity
leave regulations for teachers. 7 In the area of mandatory maternity leaves,8
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man
. . . she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her
protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and
could not be sustained. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908).
See Gilbertson, Women and the Equal Protection Clause, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 351
(1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1971); Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications
Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 481, 484 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), aff'g 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970)
(female-only admissions policy for state supported college); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (no woman shall be taken for jury service unless she volunteers for it); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state law setting minimum wages for women only);
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (statute prohibiting employment of women in
restaurants during certain hours); Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968) (statute granting women more favorable treatment than men in
computing social security benefits).
See Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48
NEB. L. REV. 131, 132 (1968).
7. For a discussion of maternity leave regulations see: Comment, Mandatory Maternity
Leave Policy in the School Systems-A Survey of Cases, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 172 (1973);
Comment, The Effect of Title VII and the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment on Mandatory
Maternity Leaves for Teachers, 12 J. FAMILY L. 447 (1972-1973); Comment, Mandatory Ma-
ternity Leaves and the Equal Protection Clause, 61 Ky. L.J. 589 (1973); Comment,
Mandatory Maternity Leave of Absence Policies-An Equal Protection Analysis, 45 TEMP.
L.Q. 240 (1972); 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 789 (1972); 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 857 (1971).
8. Cases upholding mandatory maternity leaves: Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d
1372 (9th Cir. 1972); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972);
Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 349 F. Supp. 687 (D. Conn. 1972), rev'd, 473 F.2d 629 (2d
Cir. 1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd,
465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Amster v. Board of Educ., 55 Misc. 2d 961, 286 N.Y.S.2d 687
(Sup. Ct. 1967); Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 3 Pa. Commw. 665, 285 A.2d
206 (1971), rev'd, 450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973).
Cases finding that mandatory maternity leaves deny women equal protection: Green v.
Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465
F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Heath
v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Pocklington v. Duval County
School Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972)
(under fifth amendment due process clause); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333
F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971) (decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Texas 1971) (decided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), rev'd, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972); Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (4th
Cir. 1973). See also Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 357 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the traditional equal protection test places a heavy burden upon the plain-
tiff to prove the classification "irrational, irrelevant, unreasonable, arbi-
trary or invidious."' The classification, at the minimum, must bear "some
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."10
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board" is illustrative of the view
that not all sex-based classifications are violative of the equal protection
clause. Mrs. Cohen unsuccessfully sought the approval of the Chesterfield
County School Board to continue teaching until either the eighth month
of her pregnancy 2 or, as recommended by her principal, the end of the
current semester, the sixth month of her pregnancy. Following the denial
of these requests, Mrs. Cohen commenced an action under the Civil Rights
Act of 187111 to challenge the maternity leave regulation, requiring her to
begin her maternity leave at the end of the fifth month of her pregnancy,"
on the grounds that the regulation discriminated against her because of her
sex and, therefore, constituted a denial of her constitutional rights under
the fourteenth amendment. 5 The court held that this maternity leave
9. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673-74 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
10. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). See Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457, 465 (1957); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
11. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (4-3 decision).
12. Mrs. Cohen's obstetrician gave his written approval to her working as long as she chose.
Id. at 396.
13. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
14. The case upheld the constitutionality of a school board regulation which required, with
limited flexibility, pregnant female teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth
month of pregnancy. The Chesterfield County School Board maternity leave regulation pro-
vides in part:
a. Notice in writing must be given to the School Board at least six (6) months prior
to the date of expected birth.
b. Termination of employment of an expectant mother shall become effective at least
four (4) months prior to the expected birth of the child. Termination of employment
may be extended if the superintendent receives written recommendations from the
expectant mother's physician and her principal, and if the superintendent feels that
an extension will be in the best interest of the pupils and school involved.
c. Maternity Leave
1. Maternity leave must be requested in writing at the time of termination of
employment.
2. Maternity leave will be granted only to those persons who have a record of
satisfactory performance. 474 F.2d at 396 n.2.
15. Mrs. Cohen also sought relief under the Equal Opportunity Act, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970):
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regulation is not an invidious discrimination based upon sex, but rather,
that it serves a legitimate state interest in providing for "continuity in the
instruction of children."'" Chief Judge Haynsworth reasoned in the major-
ity opinion that sexual classifications cannot possibly be arbitrary or invid-
ious unless the sexes are in actual or potential competition.'7 Pregnancy
and motherhood being a peculiar function of women, men cannot physi-
cally compete; nor can laws relieve pregnant women from the burden of
motherhood.' Thus, reasonable recognition of the fact that pregnancy and
maternity are sui generis by a governmental employer does not constitute
an arbitrary classification by sex.'9
Continuity of education, provided by a teacher who can remain with her
class throughout the school year without major interruption, is the reason-
able objective for a maternity leave regulation." Administrative conveni-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
However, at the time of the proceedings below, state agencies and educational institutions
were specifically exempted from the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 200ae-1
(1970). These exemptions were repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1972) following oral argument. Therefore,
the opinion is limited to a consideration of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
16. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973).
17. Id. at 397. Cf. Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972):
The discharge of pregnant women or bearded men does not violate the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 simply because only women become pregnant and only men grow beards.
In neither instance are similarly situated persons of the opposite sex favored. Id. at
320.
18. The burdens of motherhood may vest upon the father. See Danielson v. Board of Higher
Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), wherein the father chose to stop work and provide
child care while the mother returned to her job shortly after giving birth. The father's em-
ployer refused to extend to the father the benefits of the employer's maternity leave policy.
19. Other arguments have been advanced to sustain maternity leave regulations as consti-
tutional, but not without criticism. The safety of the unborn child and the mother was a
prime consideration in the district court decision of LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326
F. Supp. 1208, 1210-11 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), which cited
past incidents of violence in the city's schools and questioned the physical ability of a teacher
in the advanced stages of pregnancy to attend to her duties. Contra, Cohen v. Chesterfield
County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973):
"As a matter of fact, pregnant women are more likely to be incapacitated in the early stages
of pregnancy than the last four months." Id. at 1160. See 40 U. CiN. L. REv. 857, 861-62 (1971).
Even though violence is always a possibility, it does not justify the rule because the regulation
does not consider the variations in the locations of schools and the ages of students. Green v.
Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1973).
20. Other cases suggest that the notice a pregnant teacher gives in advance of her leaving
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ence is the justification for placing in the control of school officials the
decision as to when the maternity leave should begin. Following such rea-
soning, Cohen is in line with those cases which apply the traditional equal
protection test to affirm mandatory maternity leave provisions. 2'
According to Cohen, mandatory maternity leaves are not subject to the
compelling state interest test. Triggered by one of two fact situations, the
compelling state interest test demands active review or strict scrutiny
where either a suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved. 22
In either event, the state must show the statute is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest,21 and that the statute is the least oner-
ous means possible to promote the compelling state interest.24 Express
rejection of the applicability of the compelling state interest equal protec-
tion test in mandatory maternity leave cases relies on the exclusion of male
participation in the maternity process. 2 Since men cannot become preg-
nant, the regulation does not classify women on an arbitrary basis, rather,
it classifies on the basis of a physical condition which is peculiarly female.
Cohen holds that pregnancy is most often voluntary, permitting one to
anticipate and prepare for the resulting period of confinement, unlike ill-
nesses and other physical disabilities.2 This conclusion disagrees with the
contributes to preserving educational continuity by affording "more, not less, time to procure
a satisfactory long-term substitute." Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d
Cir. 1973). Evidence showing that a rigid timetable for maternity leaves actually contributes
to discontinuity was brought out in testimony by a school official in Bravo v. Board of Educ.,
345 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D. Ill. 1972). As an example, Mrs. Cohen was denied permission to
complete the semester in which she was currently teaching although she would be leaving
only one month later than required.
21. See, e.g., Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32, 39 (5th Cir. 1972);
LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d
1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Amster v. Board of Educ., 55 Misc. 2d 961, 286 N.Y.2d 687 (Sup. Ct.
1967). Contra, Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 445 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
22. Examples of suspect classifications: Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (nation-
ality); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (alienage).
Examples of fundamental rights: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate
travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915) (right to employment).
23. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
24. A legitimate state objective may exist, but by its terms a statute may be so harsh as
to deny equal protection. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
25. But see Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
26. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 398 (4th Cir. 1973). See Are
Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, supra note 5, at 496.
All pregnancies are not voluntary. Likewise, the full ramifications of the treatment of
maternity leaves are not at issue here. For a far-ranging discussion of the effects of maternity
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unrefuted medical evidence in the record and the finding of the district
court. 21 Considering the distinction as amply made, the court does not
consider the argument that men are also subject to crises of the body, some
of which provide ample warning and require elective surgery, such as a
cataract operation or a prostatectomy. Men in such situations are not
subject to premature leave because of the forthcoming medical problem, 2
nor do the general sick leave requirements require notice by any teacher
for any elective surgery. 21
The use of pregnancy as a permissible classifying trait eliminates the
imposition of the compelling state interest test. It is not clear what criteria
must be met by a given classification to be judged suspect or as involving
a fundamental right, although suggestions are made and analogies are
drawn." However, sex has been found to be a suspect classification by the
Supreme Court. 31 Viewed from a different perspective, maternity leave
regulations may trigger active review by the alternative fundamental
rights branch of the compelling state interest doctrine. 32 Here the right to
leaves and benefits see generally Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Matern-
ity Leaves, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 260 (1972).
27. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1160 (E.D. Va. 1971),
rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
28. See LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1972); Bravo v.
Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ.,
345 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Pocklington v. Duval County School Bd., 345 F.
Supp. 163, 164 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp.
438, 442 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
29. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 1973) (Winter,
J., dissenting).
30. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (analogy of sex and race); Sex
Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, supra note
5, at 1507-08 (1971) (analogy of sex and race); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 32, 65-66 (1970) (determinants for classification); Are Sex-Based Classifications Consti-
tutionally Suspect?, supra note 5, at 493-96 (characteristics of a suspect classification).
Race and sex are comparable on the following points:
(1) Both have highly visible characteristics.
(2) Both belong to large, natural groups determined at birth.
(3) Both slaves and women were at one time under the complete command of
the male head of the house.
(4) The legal position of slaves was historically justified by the analogy of the
legal status of women.
31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Prior to Frontiero, the California Supreme
Court was alone in applying the compelling interest test to a statute in finding sex a suspect
classification. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
The far-reaching implications of labeling all classifications based upon sex as suspect and
the desire not to preempt a major political decision, namely, adoption of the equal rights
amendment, are given as reasons not to find sex inherently suspect. Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
32. See, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
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employment free of discrimination unrelated to individual capabilities is
-deemed to be the basic civil right involved,3 3 consequently requiring a
showing that the regulation promotes a compelling governmental inter-
est.
3
'
In comparison to recent Supreme Court pronouncements, the essence of
the decision in Cohen is the rigid application of the traditional equal pro-
tection test. Without rejecting either the compelling state interest test or
the traditional basis approach, the Supreme Court has intensified its scru-
tiny under traditional equal protection guidelines to the point of abandon-
ing the presumption of constitutionality and concerning itself with the
means, rather than seeking any alternative, however imagined, to justify
a statute.35 Only when the sex-related means is considered can the decision
in Reed v. Reed, finding the statute violative of the equal protection
clause, be understood.3 6 Justice Brennan analyzed Reed v. Reed as a depar-
ture from traditional rational basis analysis with respect to sex-based clas-
sifications. However, Justice Brennan emphasized that the challenged
statute in Reed, as in Frontiero v. Richardson, provided "dissimilar treat-
ment for men and women who are. . . similarly situated." 3 This reason-
ing later became the basis which Chief Judge Haynsworth used to distin-
guish Cohen from Reed. The requirement found in Reed that the sexes
must be similarly situated cannot be summarily dismissed, as suggested
by Cohen, since male and female public school teachers are similarly situ-
ated as to the effect administrative treatment of medical conditions has
on their employment status. Indeed, under the strict scrutiny test made
applicable by Frontiero to sex-based classifications, Cohen would fail be-
cause administrative convenience is not sufficient justification under this
standard.3
33. Id. at 443. See Mandatory Maternity Leave of Absence Policies-An Equal Protection
Analysis, supra note 7, at 249-50.
Sex cannot be a basis for employment decisions unless sex is a "bona fide occupational
qualification." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1972). Specifically, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm'n has set forth guidelines prohibiting the employment of females because of
pregnancy. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972). See Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leaves and the
Equal Protection Clause, 61 Ky. L.J. 589, 598-99 (1973).
34. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
35. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 621 (1960). This alternate method of review has been
suggested by early decisions of the Burger Court and would at least subject the maternity
leave provisions to greater scrutiny than the traditional test. See generally Gunther, Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
36. Gunther, supra note 35, at 34. The old equal protection test was applied in Reed v.
Reed and the new equal protection test was met by the state, but the statute was found to
be in violation of the equal protection clause.
37. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
38. There is no compelling reason for discrimination because of administrative efficiency
1974]
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The maternity leave regulation in Cohen is upheld without consideration
of its true discriminatory effect which is brought about by its being manda-
tory. 9 By setting an arbitrary and fixed date for the commencement of
maternity leave, the regulation treats female teachers differently from
male teachers. In effect, the regulation denies the pregnant female teacher
the right to work, often without medical reason." There is no compelling
reason for such a discriminatory regulation.
R.D.P.
since "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
39. A new maternity leave policy (incorporating a flexible determination of how long a
prospective mother may teach before the expected birth of her child and based on a decision
by teacher and principal as to the last date of employment) was held to have mooted the
question of the constitutionality of the prior mandatory maternity leave policy on which the
action was brought. Guelich v. Mounds View Independent Pub. School Dist., 334 F. Supp.
1276 (D. Minn. 1972). The courts have made suggestions as to alternate provisions. Williams
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 449-50 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
40. Legislative concern for a pregnant teacher's health is said to be irrational because
regulations treat all pregnancies alike. See, e.g., Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155,
158 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 443-
44 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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